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rather than the Federal Constitution, it is likely that the outcome
would have been the same.
1 54
People v. Jones
(decided May 9, 1994)

The defendant claimed that the prosecutor failed to create a
prima facie example of race discrimination required to trigger a
Batson inquiry. 155 The use of peremptory challenges by counsel
for the purpose of excluding jurors on the basis of race is a
violation of .the Equal Protection Clause of both the United
States 156 and New York State 157 Constitutions. 158 The Appellate
Division, Second Department, affirmed the trial court's decision
to seat two challenged jurors based on the court's finding that the
race neutral explanations given by defense counsel for exclusion
59
were pretextual. 1
During jury selection for the trial, the prosecutor claimed
defense counsel was using his peremptory challenges1 60 to
remove venirepersons from the jury panel due to the fact that
they were white. 16 1 In response, defense counsel provided race
neutral explanations to the court for his strikes.1 62 However,
although defense counsel's explanations were facially race
154. 204 A.D.2d 485, 611 N.Y.S.2d 640 (2d Dep't 1994).
155. Id. at 485, 611 N.Y.S.2d at 641 (referring to a test used for prompt
resolution to objections to peremptory challenges found in the famous case of
Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986)).
156. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. The Equal Protection Clause provides
in pertinent part: "No State shall... deny to any person within its jurisdiction
the equal protection of the laws." Id.
157. N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 11. Section 11 states in relevant part: "No
person shall be denied the equal protection of the laws of this state or any
subdivision thereof." Id.
158. Jones, 204 A.D.2d at 485, 611 N.Y.S.2d at 641.
159. Id.
160. The permitted amount of peremptory challenges, challenges made
without a showing of reason, are permitted in state criminal cases is provided
by N.Y. CIM.PROC. LAW § 270.25 (McKinney 1993 &Supp. 1994).
161. Jones, 204 A.D.2d at 485, 611 N.Y.S.2d at 641.
162. Id.
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neutral, the trial judge found them to be pretextual, and
subsequently seated two of the challenged jurors. 163 Based on an
acting in concert theory, the jury convicted the defendant of
manslaughter in the first degree, and defendant appealed. 164
In affirming the conviction, the appellate division held that
where "trial counsel has proffered race neutral explanations for
peremptory challenges and the court has ruled as to the validity
of those explanations, [the peremptory challenge issue] becomes
academic. ' 165 The analysis set forth in Batson provides an
efficient 'method for prompt decisions by the courts concerning
objections made about peremptory challenges. First, the objecting
party must make a prima facie demonstration that counsel used
peremptory challenges to exclude potential jurors on the basis of
race. 166 Second, if such a showing is made, the burden shifts to
opposing counsel to provide race neutral explanations for the
strikes. 167 Finally, it is for the trial court to decide if counsel has
demonstrated purposeful discrimination by the attorney exercising
168
his strikes.

The defense counsel in Jones did not wait for the trial court to
request that the prosecutor first establish a prima facie case of
discrimination, but rather, immediately stated race neutral
explanations for his strikes. 169 Consequently,

it was not

necessary for the prosecutor to satisfy the first criteria of the
Batson inquiry, in that it was rendered moot by the fact that
163. Id.
164. Id. The defendant was charged in the shooting of an individual who
had allegedly robbed a drug sale area guarded by the defendant. Id.
165. Id. In addition to the equal protection claim, the court found it legally
adequate to fix the defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt when the
evidence was viewed in a light most favorable to the prosecution. Id. at 486,
611 N.Y.S.2d at 641. Moreover, in exercising its power of factual review, the
appellate court was satisfied that the guilty verdict was not in contravention
with the weight of the evidence. Id. at 486, 611 N.Y.S.2d at 641-42.
166. Batson, 476 U.S. at 79.
167. Id.
168. Id. (reversing the defendant's conviction because trial court "flatly
rejected" removal of all black venirepersons without requiring prosecutor to
provide race neutral basis for his strikes).
169. Jones, 204 A.D.2d at 485, 611 N.Y.S.2d at 641.
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defense counsel immediately jumped to the second prong of the
170
test by providing race neutral reasons to the trial court.
Therefore, the only aspect of the inquiry left for the trial court
was to evaluate the validity of defense counsel's explanations,
which were found to be merely pretextual. 17 1 As articulated in
Hernandez v. New York, 172 the United States Supreme Court
explained that great deference is given to the trial court's

assessment of the validity of counsel's race neutral explanations
17 3
for peremptory strikes.
In Hernandez, the Supreme Court noted that the main issue to
be determined by the trial court concerning counsel's race neutral
explanations is their credibility. 174 Due to the fact that "the
finding will 'largely turn on evaluation of credibility,'" the

Supreme Court found it proper to defer to the trial court's
findings concerning issues involving intent to discriminate. 1 75 In
so doing, the Court held that it would not overturn a trial court's
decision concerning discriminatory intent unless the finding was
176
clearly erroneous.
New York law is in harmony with the federal law concerning
the deference which should be given to the trial court in

determining whether peremptory challenges were racially
motivated. 17 7 Specifically, in People v. Green, 17 8 the Appellate
170. See Hernandez v. New York, 500 U.S. 352 (1991). "Once a
prosecutor has offered a race-neutral explanation for the peremptbry challenges
and the trial court has ruled on the ultimate iuestion of intentional
discrimination, the preliminary issue of whether the defendant had made a
prima facie showing becomes moot." Id. at 359.
171. Jones, 204 A.D.2d at 485, 611 N.Y.S.2d at 641. The appellate
division found no reason to overturn the trial court's finding that the raceneutral explanations were pretextual. Id. In addition, the court gave great
deference to the trial court's finding. Id. See Hernandez,500 U.S. at 372.
172. 500 U.S. 352 (1991).
173. Id. at 372 (holding that trial court came to correct conclusion that
prosecutor's basis for exercise of peremptory strikes was race neutral).
174. Id. at 365.
175. Id. (quoting Batson, 476 U.S. at 98 n.21).
176. Id. at 369.
177. See, e.g., People v. Kern, 75 N.Y.2d 638, 650, 554 N.E.2d 1235,
1241, 555 N.Y.S.2d 647, 653 (holding that Batson applies to use of
peremptory challenges by the defense), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 824 (1990);
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Division, Second Department reiterated the rule set forth in
Hernandez, that a trial court should be given great deference to
determine whether or not counsel's race neutral explanations are
9
pretextual. 17
In conclusion, federal courts and the New York courts clearly
give great deference to a trial court's determination of the
credibility of trial counsel's race neutral explanations.
Accordingly, upon finding that the trial court was not clearly
erroneous in determining that defense counsel's race neutral

explanations were pretextual, the Appellate Division, Second
Department, in
defendant. 180

Jones,

affirmed

the

conviction

of

the

People v. Stiff1 8 1
(decided December 12, 1994)

The criminal defendant claimed the trial court erred when it
refused to allow him to use his peremptory challenges to
"exclude potential jurors because they [did] not belong to a
particular racial group." 182 The Appellate Division, Second
Department, concluded that it was unconstitutional for either the
defendant or the prosecutor to use racially motivated peremptory

People v. Green, 181 A.D.2d 693, 694, 581 N.Y.S.2d 357, 358 (2d Dep't
1990) (affirming trial court's finding that defendant counsel's race neutral
basis proffered for challenge to white juror was pretextual).
178. 181 A.D.2d 693, 581 N.Y.S.2d 357. In Green, the prosecution
objected to the defendant's use of peremptory challenges claiming they were
being used to exclude white jurors. Id. at 693, 581 N.Y.S.2d at 358. Eleven of
the defendant's thirteen peremptory challenges were used to exclude potential
white jurors. Id. The prosecution proceeded to establish a prima facie case of
discrimination and defense counsel was forced to "articulate race-neutral
explanations for the challenges." Id. Finding the excuses to be pretextual, the
trial court seated two of the jurors to which the defendant had objected. Id.
179. Id. at 694, 581 N.Y.S.2d at 358.
180. Jones, 204 A.D.2d at 485, 611 N.Y.S.2d at 641.
181. 206 A.D.2d 235, 620 N.Y.S.2d 87 (2d Dep't 1994).
182. Id. at 236, 620 N.Y.S.2d at 88.
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